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Abstract—The most fundamental purpose of blockchain tech-
nology is to enable persistent, consistent, distributed storage of
information. Increasingly common are authentication systems
that leverage this property to allow users to carry their personal
data on a device while a hash of this data is signed by a
trusted authority and then put on a blockchain to be compared
against. For instance, in 2015, MIT introduced a schema for
the publication of their academic certificates based on this
principle. In this work, we propose a way for users to obtain
assured identities based on face-to-face proofing that can then be
validated against a record on a blockchain. Moreover, in order to
provide anonymity, instead of storing a hash, we make use of a
scheme of Brands to store a commitment against which one can
perform zero-knowledge proofs of identity. We also enforce the
confidentiality of the underlying data by letting users control a
secret of their own. We show how our schema can be implemented
on Bitcoin’s blockchain and how to save bandwidth by grouping
commitments using Merkle trees to minimize the number of
Bitcoin transactions that need to be sent. Finally, we describe
a system in which users can gain access to services thanks to the
identity records of our proposal.
Index Terms—Bitcoin blockchain, Identity proofs, Discrete
Logarithm REPresentation (DLREP)
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a common occurrence in modern life to authenticate
part of one’s identity by appealing to an existing relation-
ship with a third-party service. Users have primary forms of
identification such as passports and drivers’ licenses issued
by governments, but they may also need to use secondary
forms of identification from trusted sources whose business
model nevertheless is not that of an identity provider. For
example, in order to establish one’s address before buying
a cellular plan or obtaining a library card, one can provide
a utility bill. One might want to replace this system by one
in which a digital record is issued to users that can serve the
role of the paper utility bill. A simple way of doing this is
for the identity issuer to sign a digital identity document that
the user can then store on her device. However, in such a
system, it can be difficult for the issuer to update or revoke
the document if there are changes to the user’s identity. Issuers
can create revocation lists, such as the ones used in public key
infrastructures, but using these lists can pose subtle challenges
[1]. We will propose a system for this setting that uses
properties of blockchains to provide for streamlined, integrated
revocation and updating of identities.
II. RELATED WORK
There are several proposals to use blockchains to store
identity information. For a survey of such proposals see [2]
and [3]. In particular, MIT Media Labs [4] proposes a system
in which academic certificates can be verified against records
stored in the Bitcoin blockchain and which are considered
revoked if the issuer spends a Bitcoin transaction output. The
Blockstack project [5] has implemented decentralized versions
of PKI and DNS using the Bitcoin blockchain. The uPort
[6] project, which has been implemented in the Ethereum
[7] blockchain, includes a smart contract that allows a user
who has lost her device to regain access to an identity
after being authenticated by several pre-designated contacts.
Other proposals involve new blockchains that are designed
for their specific applications. Namecoin [8] and Certcoin
[9] have implemented DNS and PKI respectively on the
Namecoin blockchain. In [10], a system is proposed to use
zero-knowledge proofs and either Namecoin or Bitcoin to issue
identity credentials in settings such as anonymous peer-to-peer
networks, where one does not have trusted credential issuers.
While using an application designed blockchain can provide
greater flexibility, they have less mining power than Bitcoin,
which can have security implications for schemes built on top
of them, see the security analysis of the Namecoin blockchain
in [5]. Similarly, IDCoins [11] uses a custom blockchain
whose proof of work is related to the generation of GPG/PGP
keys. These keys are then used to create a web of trust. In
[12] a system is proposed to store user personal information
such as the GPS data from their phone in a distributed hash
table; then this hash table is coupled with a blockchain that
stores pointers to the data and permissions on how it may
be used. The Estonian government has built an electronic
records system based on the Guardtime KSI blockchain [13],
[14], which is a permissioned, namely only authorized parties
can publish transactions to this blockchain. The proposition
of ChainAnchor [15] attempts to create a semi-permissioned
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2structure on existing blockchains, potentially including the
Bitcoin blockchain, by changing the incentive structure of
miners to promote transactions that have passed a layer of
authentication.
III. OUR CONTRIBUTION
We present a identity management system based on the
Bitcoin blockchain that allows for a very flexible user ex-
perience, providing identity documents that can be used in
a wide variety of use cases. To achieve this flexibility, it is
necessary to provide protections for user privacy, particularly
considering the public nature of information on blockchains.
To do this, we incorporate into our protocol a zero-knowledge,
selective disclosure identity scheme due to Brands [16]. This
scheme corresponds particularly well to our proposal as its
security is based on cryptographic primitives that are already
used in Bitcoin. Moreover, by combining the potential to
only reveal the information about one’s identity required for a
given authentication with identity records stored on the global,
widely accessible Bitcoin network, we empower users to take
greater control over their identities.
Compared to most previous work that uses blockchains to
offer comparably general identity documents [13], [11], we
consider it an advantage that we work within the structure
of the existing Bitcoin blockchain, the most established and
secure blockchain and the blockchain that is supported by
the greatest amount of mining power, in a way that is con-
sistent with Bitcoins’ existing incentive structure. By doing
so, our system has the same security as Bitcoin itself while
minimizing the additional infrastructure required. Compared to
[10], which explores the possibility of using either Bitcoin or
Namecoin, we further develop ways in which one can embed
aspects of identity management into the transactional structure
of Bitcoin.
Specifically, we build on the ideas of using this transac-
tional structure to encode revocation of certificates in [4] and
updating of logs in [17]. These methods allow us to provide
for an integrated, streamlined mechanism for revocation and
updating of the identity documents issued by our system.
In doing so, we resolve several technical challenges related
to the interplay between revocation, the structure of Bitcoin,
and Brands’ anonymous credentials. Particularly, we provide a
means for the user to have a secret required for authenticating
against an identity record that continues to perform this role
even as the user’s identity record is updated.
IV. BACKGROUND
Our system will involve commitments to users’ identities
being written into the Bitcoin blockchain. The commitment
scheme that we make use of, due to Brands [16], will allow
users to disclose selective elements of their identity against this
commitment in keeping with the principle that only necessary
information about a user should be circulated and stored. Also,
we will notice that Brands selective disclosure uses similar
cryptographic primitives to Bitcoin, discrete logarithms and
hash functions, so the security of our two building blocks are
related.
A. Brands selective disclosure scheme
We follow [16]. Suppose we want to make selective disclo-
sures involving an identity with n fields, (X1, . . . , Xn). (For
example, X1 may represent a user’s name, X2 her nationality,
etc). Let q be a prime number and G a group of order q,
in which the discrete logarithm is hard. For our purposes,
we will take G to be the Koblitz elliptic curve secp256k1,
(we use multiplicative notation for compatibility with [16]).
Note that by using the same group that is used in the
Bitcoin signature protocol, we reduce the number of different
cryptographic primitives on which our system depends. Let
g0, g1, . . . , gn ∈ G.
Furthermore, Brands notes that there is the need for an
auxiliary random X0. This will prevent an attacker who knows
some of the Xj fields for a user from performing a dictionary
attack in which she guesses values for the other Xj .
Definition 1: The tuple (X0, X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ Zn+1q is
called a Discrete Logarithm REPresentation (DLREP) of h =
n∏
j=0
g
Xj
j ∈ G with respect to (g0, g1, . . . , gn).
In order for a prover P to establish knowledge of a DLREP
of h to a verifier V , the following procedure is performed [16,
§2.4.3]
1) P generates n+1 random, secret numbers a0, a1, . . . , an.
Let A =
n∏
j=0
g
aj
j . P sends A to V .
2) V provides a challenge number c.
3) P computes bj = aj + cXj , j = 0, 1, . . . , n and sends
them to V .
4) The verifier V checks that
n∏
j=0
g
bj
j h
−c = A holds.
We denote such an interactive proof pi. Note that it is essential
that P knows all of the Xj in order to be able to perform step
3. Particularly, X0 which is secret and generated randomly
acts as a sort of key to be able to perform these proofs.
More generally, in [16, Chapter 3], it is shown how to prove
arbitrary satisfiable Boolean statements about the Xj’s using
such a Discrete Logarithm REPresentation without revealing
other information. Thus, there is a great deal of flexibility in
what a user can prove about her identity. She can, for example,
provide a proof that she is a French citizen AND that she lives
at a certain address, or that she is under 18 OR over 65. In
this way, the user can prove (true) statements about her identity
that contain an arbitrary number of ANDs, ORs, and NOTs
in such a way that a verifier learns only the content of the
statement. Specifically, Brands shows:
Proposition 1: [16, Proposition 3.6.1] There is a construc-
tive protocol for demonstrating arbitrary satisfiable Boolean
formulas in which X0 does not appear such that:
1) The protocol is complete and sound
2) The protocol is a proof of knowledge of a DL-
representation h with respect to the tuple (g0, . . . , gn)
3) For any distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn), whatever informa-
tion a verifier in an adaptively chosen formula attack
can compute about (X1, . . . , Xn) can also be computed
using merely its a priori information and the status of the
formulas requested.
3Moreover, Brands [16] shows that if the discrete loga-
rithm problem is difficult, DLREP is one-way and collision-
intractable, preventing forgery attacks.
We make two remarks on subtleties involved in the use of
this protocol:
Remark 1: Note that P should not re-use the same A with
different challenges c, see Section 5.4 of [16] on limited use
identities; however, one may prove multiple different formulas
about the same DLREP h if the A is changed for each
challenge.
Remark 2: One should be careful to not publish two
commitments using the same X0. Namely, one should not
publish h =
n∏
j=0
g
Xj
j and h
′ =
n∏
j=0
g
X′j
j , with X0 = X
′
0, as this
would allow potential attackers who can guess plausible values
for (some of) the Xj and X ′j to calculate h/h
′ =
n∏
j=1
g
Xj−X′j
j ,
which no longer contains a blinding factor and might permit
a dictionary attack.
We will see in Section VII that the issue discussed in
Remark 2 presents difficulties in issuing an identity which can
be updated by an identity issuer even as the user maintains X0
secret. We will overcome this problem by splitting X0 into two
pieces of information, both of which are necessary to perform
the selective disclosure proofs: X00, which is only known by
the user, and X01, which can be updated by the issuer, see
Sections VII-A, VII-B.
B. Bitcoin relevant notions
Bitcoin transactions are made up of inputs and outputs; in
fact, all bitcoins exist in the form of Unspent Transaction
Outputs (UTXOs) [18], [19, Chapter 5]. A given transaction
can have several inputs, each of which was an output of some
previous Bitcoin transaction. Each transaction also has one or
more outputs each of which has an amount of bitcoin attached
to it. For each input, a script must be provided establishing
the right to spend the input. (A script which details what
must be established is included in the transaction that issued
this input as an UTXO.) Most transaction outputs correspond
to a Bitcoin “address,” which is generally the hash of the
public key that can spend that output. Then to spend that
output one must merely provide this public key and sign
the transaction with the private key. A special output type
that is relevant to our work is that of OP_RETURN outputs;
each such output contains up to 80 bytes of space in which
the sender of a transaction can store arbitrary information. A
requirement of OP_RETURN outputs is to have zero bitcoins
associated to them; as such, they are provably not spendable,
avoiding the necessity for miners to store them as UTXOs.
Non-OP_RETURN outputs must have positive bitcoin amounts
assigned to them, and in fact there is a minimum amount per
output in order for a transaction to be considered “standard”
and be included in the blocks of miners who use the Bitcoin
Core software [19]. This amount varies slightly based on the
output, but as of version 0.14 (March 2017) of Bitcoin Core
[20], it is on the order of .000005 bitcoin, which is around
.01 USD (1 BTC=2280 USD, May 2017).
When creating a Bitcoin transaction, a user broadcasts a
“raw transaction” to the nodes containing: the amount of
bitcoin to associate to each output, the script setting up
the requirements to spend each output, and the scripts for
each input that satisfy the requirements established when
the corresponding output was created. These requirements
typically include signing the transaction with a private key
corresponding to the previous output. Each transaction then
has a transaction identifier (txid) which is the hash of this raw
transaction. A Merkle tree is formed from these transaction
identifiers the root hash of which is included in the block
header. Hence, the raw transaction, including which inputs and
outputs were involved in a given transaction, is committed to
in the blockchain in an immutable way.
V. ACTORS AND PROTOCOL STRUCTURE
In our system, a user (USR) wishes to authenticate her
identity to a service provider (SP). We will have the following
additional actors:
• Identity Verifiers (IV) - organization such as a bank or
utility company that has an existing relationship with
USR and can provide justification for aspects of her
identity.
• Service Enablers (SE) - capable of verifying the records
that various IV have created for USR in the blockchain
and conveying information about these records to SP .
The public key pkSE of SE should be well-known.
Just like a bank or utility company in a traditional setting,
we assume that IV has a complete knowledge of USR’s
identity record. Thus USR must confer to IV a great deal
of trust to not misuse this personal information. IV pub-
lishes commitments to identity documents into the Bitcoin
blockchain on the basis of which USR can justify her identity,
and IV publishes updates to these records if necessary.
When required to demonstrate that her identity satisfies
some requirements determined by SP in order to obtain a
service, USR will prove this information to SE . Thus, SP
must trust SE to accurately relay whether the user meets the
requirements and not to perform fraudulent authentications.
Moreover, SE will also learn personal information about the
user, namely whatever USR had to demonstrate to SP and
the fact that USR obtained a service from SP . (In contrast,
SP will not necessarily learn anything about USR beyond the
fact that a client of IV that satisfies its requirements obtained
a service through the intermediary of SE .) USR needs to trust
SE to not misuse this personal information; however, we will
see that USR only needs to reveal partial information about
her identity to SE . Also, we imagine that there are several
companies willing to fill the role of the service enabler, so if
USR is worried that SE is developing too complete a profile
on her, she can perform future authentications through some
other service enabler.
For a further discussion of the assumptions we make on IV
and SE , see the discussion on our security model in Section
X.
Remark 3: The service enabler has infrastructure allowing it
to manage the authentication operations that may be required
4of a user by a service provider. Some sophisticated service
providers may prefer to perform these operations themselves
rather than make use of a third party. Similarly, identity
verifiers can also perform the role of the service enabler
themselves while still retaining the some of the advantages of
using a blockchain, particularly in terms of ease of revocation
and updates. However, by outsourcing the service enabler
role to a specialized entity, IV can reduce infrastructure
costs. Also, IV does not need to be as “lively” as SE .
Namely, whereas SE must be continuously online to enable
authentications, IV only needs to come online periodically to
publish or update identities. Also note that if one combines
the SE role with either the IV or the SP role, there is a
pooling of information from the different roles that the user
may not be comfortable with, and the users ability to change
SE periodically for greater anonymity as discussed above
would be limited. Thus, users may prefer the model with a
distinct SE .
Remark 4: Note that a given user may have accounts
with several different IV (her bank, her utility company, her
university, etc) and want to authenticate herself to several
different SP . However, she can authenticate through the same
SE for each of these accounts; thus SE can serve as a single
service sign-on.
In practice, we imagine USR interacting with SE via
a website or a mobile phone app. The user’s identity in-
formation will be entered into her computer or phone, but
not disclosed to SE . Note that the user’s device must be
able to open a secure communications channel with SE and
be able to perform the cryptographic operations of Section
IV-A. The communication can be established in a standard
way with TLS. Denote pkUSR, pkSE , skUSR, skSE , the
public and private (secret) keys of USR and SE respectively.
The TLS channel corresponding to these keys is denoted
TLSpkUSR,pkSE . Establishing these keys can be performed
when USR sets up an account with SE , independently of
the enrollment steps of Section VII. These steps should be
anonymous for the user; namely it is not required that USR
gives her real identity to SE during this process, while SE
should have a well-known and trusted public key.
VI. SET-UP PHASE
In order for service enablers to verify the authenticity of
records issued by identity verifiers, we must begin with a set-
up phase in which identity verifiers communicate to service
enablers the Bitcoin address aIV that they will use to issue
new identity records in the enrollment phase, Section VII.
IV should also communicate to SE the points g0 . . . gn in
secp256k1 that it will use for its selective disclosure protocols
as in IV-A.
VII. ENROLLMENT PHASE
During the enrollment phase, IV will publish the root of a
Merkle tree that commits to the (up-to-date) identities of all of
its users USR1, . . . ,USRN . IV will update this information
(at most) once per Bitcoin block, namely about once every
10 minutes, via a Bitcoin transaction that we will denote
TXENROLL.
A. Calculation of DLREP
We detail the steps required for IV to calculate a DLREP
encoding USRi’s identity.
• Each new user USRi establishes her identity to IV by
showing primary identity documents such as a passport
of a driver’s license. This is typical of the process of
opening a bank account, for example. Denote the relevant
user identity fields by X1, . . . , Xn.
• USRi chooses a secret, random X00, and communicates
h00 = g
X00
0 to IV along with a Brands proof that she
knows an X00 such that h00 has the appropriate form
(preventing an abusive user from submitting an h00 of an
another form such as agb0 for some chosen a and b).
• IV chooses a random X01, which is securely commu-
nicated to USRi. USRi sets X0 = X00 + X01. (We
will see in Section VII-B that this manner of collectively
choosing X0 between USRi and IV will be useful when
performing updates to issued identities.)
• IV computes hUSRi = h00 · gX010 ·
n∏
j=1
g
Xj
j =
n∏
j=0
g
Xj
j .
B. Updating a DLREP and X0
Sometimes a user’s identity fields will change. She may
change nationalities or she may turn 18 and no longer be
marked as a minor. In this case, IV should have a con-
venient mechanism for updating the user’s identity record
which requires computing an updated h′USRi . This presents
the problem that, as we saw in Remark 2, IV should not
publish two Brands commitments hUSRi and h
′
USRi that share
the same X0. However, it may not always be practical for
IV and USRi to manually regenerate a new secret X0 as in
Section VII-A; there may be situations where IV is notified
by governmental agencies such as tax or immigration services
of a change in a user’s identity, or a user may notify IV of
a change in her identity in writing and may not be online to
re-perform the exchange of X0. Hence, IV should be able to
unilaterally make changes to USRi’s records.
We propose that for each update, the X0 should be updated
as well. Suppose a given USRi’s identity is being updated
for the k-th time to commit to an identity of X(k)1 , . . . , X
(k)
n .
Then, X0 will be replaced by X
(k)
0 = X00+H
k(X01), where
Hk is SHA-256 applied k times. Even though IV does not
know X00, it can compute g
X
(k)
0
0 = h00 · gH
k(X01)
0 . Then, IV
can compute the updated Brands commitment:
h
(k)
USRi = hUSRi · g
X
(k)
0
0 ·
(
gX00
)−1
·
n∏
j=1
g
X
(k)
j −Xj
j .
This schema has the result that
• If a field of USRi’s identity has changed, she can
compute offline the new X(k)0 , without having to re-
perform an online communication with IV to transmit
gX0 , as she knows both X00 and X01.
• Only USRi knows X00, thus only USRi has the infor-
mation necessary to construct X0 and perform Brands
proofs based on the commitment hUSRi .
5Furthermore, we want this process to preserve the same
privacy guarantees as (static) Brands proofs. We argue that,
in the random oracle model, for an attacker who does not
possess X01 or any of the Hk(X01), the X00 +Hk(X01) are
randomly distributed (modulo the order of the elliptic curve).
Hence, from the perspective of such an attacker, this process
is equivalent to USRi and IV re-performing the enrollment
phase of Section VII to re-issue the identity with a new
manually chosen, random X0. See the appendix for more
detail.
Remark 5: We recommend that at any given time, IV only
store the Hk(X01) necessary to perform the next update. As a
result, even if Hk(X01) is stolen from IV’s servers, as long as
this theft is detected before the user’s identity is next updated,
a thief will not have the means to remove the blinding factor
and perform a dictionary attack against any of the previously
published versions of the user’s identity. Recall that these
protections are based on the arguments of the appendix, which
are themselves based on the work of Brands [16].
Remark 6: Note that, in the computation of h(k)USRi , IV does
not need to know the values of the Xj that do not change,
X
(k)
j = Xj . This can potentially allow identity verifiers to
delete user information that they never expect to have to update
later, even as the user can continue to their identity record
to prove this aspect of their identity. As laws regulating the
storage of personal data become more stringent, such as under
the soon to come into effect General data protection regulation
of the European Union [21], IV storing less customer data can
mean less investment required in compliance departments and
lower financial liabilities for data breaches.
C. Publication of DLREPs
IV will now post to the blockchain the root rIV,t of a
Merkle tree that commits to the state at time t of the identities
for each of its users. (Note that these are not the same Merkle
trees that exist natively in Bitcoin, see IV-B, even though the
same data structure is used.) To compute rIV,t, IV must both
add new users to the tree and edit the information for existing
users if their DLREP has been updated as above. We describe
how to proceed. Standard trees are dynamic structures, where
leaves corresponding to an entry may move in the tree as its
data evolves and grows in size. In our case, we want to keep
fixed the path to a user’s entry, so she can not authenticate
using a previous, out-of-date, authentication path in the tree.
As a consequence, we use a Merkle tree that is very large
relative to the number of users to allow for future growth.
Specifically, based on a simplified version of the data structure
proposed in [22], we use a virtual tree with 2256 leaves the
paths to which are given using each bit of a SHA-256 hash to
indicate which binary branch to take at each node. We denote
USR’s position in the tree by ιUSRi , or the index of USRi
(see Figure 2 for an example). In [22] this path is given by the
hash of verifiable random function of a username; here, IV
may attribute to each user an account number and then take
the hash of this value, ιUSRi = H(account numberUSRi). IV
will publish in an OP_RETURN the root of this tree (at time
t) rIV,t and also a commitment that tracks all changes made
to the tree cmIV,t as below.
• For each user USRi of IV , an index ιUSR is
calculated as above. IV creates a 256 layer deep
Merkle tree in which the leaf at each ιUSRi is
H(hUSRi ,metadataUSRi), where H is SHA-256. The
metadata can include information such as an expiry data
of the issued identity or other limitations on its use. All
leaves that do not correspond to an ιUSRi contain an
empty leaf. This tree has root rIV,t.
• If any updates have been made to pre-existing identities,
then the leaf consisting of the user’s (now updated)
information should remain in the same location of the tree
ιUSRi . In particular, if the metadata has changed for an
identity, such as the extension of its expiration date, etc,
this can be appended to or replace the previous metadata.
• For the first commitment IV makes, it takes cmIV,1 =
rIV,1. Later, if IV has already computed cmIV,t−1, it
computes cmIV,t = H(cmIV,t−1, rIV,t).
• IV publishes to the Bitcoin blockchain a transaction,
TXENROLL, of the following form:
Input Addresses Output Addresses
aIV aIV
OP_RETURN (rIV,t, cmIV,t)
The input from the address aIV should be the output
of the previous TXENROLL. One should calibrate to have
one new transaction of this form in each block, namely
approximately once every ten minutes.
As this transaction represents encoded semantic meaning
in our system rather than financial data, the amounts of the
inputs and outputs are secondary. Indeed, in the manner of
[23], [24], [4], the amounts should be at or near the minimum
output amounts to be considered a standard transaction ([19],
[20]).
Remark 7: Note that the mechanism by which we create
a Merkle tree of the H(hUSRi ,metadataUSRi) is similar to
the structure of how [22] creates a public key registry, as
implemented into a blockchain in [17]. In [22], ιUSRi is calcu-
lated with a keyed, verifiable function of a username in a way
that is designed to prevent third parties from determining the
position in the tree corresponding to a given username. This is
done to prevent such third parties from tracking whether the
information corresponding to that username has changed by
tracking changes in the intermediate hashes along the branch
to its location, which we see below must be circulated to other
users that have indices near ιUSRi . As ιUSRi in our case is
not computed from public information, these precautions are
less relevant but are nonetheless compatible with our system at
the expense of additional overhead in the case that the policies
of IV require them.
Remark 8: Note that none of the history of the identity
records emitted by IV can be changed without changing
cmIV,t. As such, one could eventually migrate this system
to another blockchain by simply transferring the last value
cmIV,t, which ensures the integrity of all of the preceding
information.
6Remark 9: Rather than forming a hash tree of the identity
records of IV’s users, it would be more straightforward for
each user to have their hUSRi included in an OP_RETURN
in a separate Bitcoin transaction. This is the model for [4],
where each certificate is issued via its own transaction. Unfor-
tunately, this presents scaling problems. First, as the number
of transaction which IV has to issue increases, this increases
the costs paid in transaction fees (compare to our estimates of
these costs in Section XI). Second, Bitcoin blocks are currently
limited to 1MB in total size and calibrated so that there is one
block per 10 minutes [19]. As a result, there is a limit on the
total number of Bitcoin transactions that can issued of about 7
transactions per second [5]. While there are efforts to increase
this limit [25], our system if widely adopted risks having a
number of users that exceeds what could be supported by the
network if each must have her own issuing transaction.
D. Information to be distributed by IV
In order for a user USRi to be able to authenticate against
her identity hUSRi , she will need to be able to demonstrate that
hUSRi is present in the last published Merkle tree. For this,
the user will need the txid of one of IV’s issuing transaction
which can then be traced to the most up-to-date information
published by IV , txidIV , the location of her entry in the
Merkle tree, ιUSRi , and the intermediate hashes of the tree
along the branch where this entry is located. If USRi’s identity
is updated, in the most recent rIV,t this branch will lead to
the updated commitment cmIV,t, so USRi will no longer be
able to authenticate her old identity against it.
USRi will need to know if her identity is updated. We
imagine that if some field of USRi’s identity has been
invalidated by IV , that IV must notify her. Thus, USRi
should have up-to-date values of her X1 . . . Xn. She can track
the number of notifications of updates k that she receives in
order to be able to calculate the current value of X(k)0 =
X00 +H
k(X01).
We also envisage IV distributing non-sensitive information
to the various service enablers that is nevertheless important
to the functioning of the system. It makes sense for this
information to be stored by SE whose primary role, in contrast
to IV , is in the facilitation of the identity system. Thus, we
can avoid IV having to be “lively” and ready to distribute
information at any given time to various users. As these SE
are required by their business model to be lively so as to be
able to enable authentications, this additional role does not
substantially burden them.
Specifically, if any user’s entry in the Merkle tree is updated,
that will affect the intermediate hashes that then need to
be made available to the other users a service which can
be provided by SE . Hence, we imagine SE storing the tree
information (H(hUSRi ,metadataUSRi), ιUSRi) so that these
intermediate hashes can be recalculated as necessary. See
Section XII for estimation on how much data must be stored.
On the other hand, if IV distributes all this information to all
of the SE in the market, this results in a substantial redundancy
of a significant amount of data. Hence, the best course of
action may be to have IV distribute the entire tree to a small
SE
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Figure 1. Schema of interactions between USR, SE , and SP during the
proof of identity phase.
number of service enablers, then when a user wants to use
her identity, she can download the required information from
one of these service enablers whether that is the SE that she
will later correspond with in the proof of identity phase (see
Section VIII) or not.
E. Comments on updating and revocation
As a special case of updating, IV can revoke an identity
by replacing hUSRi with an empty string.
SE can be assured of having the most recent information
published by IV , because if SE checks an out-of-date entry,
it will see that the output to aIV has been spent. SE can then
follow a chain of transactions to the last published Merkle
root.
Our system takes advantage of the fact that, in Bitcoin,
a decentralized, Byzantine fault resistant, highly available
system of nodes is tracking whether updates are made to their
list of UTXOs. As any update made to our system implies
an update tracked by these nodes, this provides an effective
mechanism to track updates to our system. See [4] and [17]
for architectures that employ a similar idea in different use
cases.
VIII. PROOF OF IDENTITY PHASE
In this section we show how USR can use an identity that
she has been issued by IV via the process of Section VII to
authenticate herself and gain access to a service provided by
SP . We suppose that USR has downloaded the intermediate
hashes on the path to her entry of the Merkle tree as in
Section VII-D from some service enabler (that is not necessary
the same as SE below). As we discussed in Section V,
USR and SE should have previously properly set-up the
necessary keys to open the secure communications channel
TLSpkUSR,pkSE . (This might occur upon USR downloading
SE’s mobile app and opening an account). Then, the following
steps are performed, where communication between USR and
SE is done through this channel:
In more detail, over the TLS channel between USR and SE ,
USR communicates to SE what service she is requesting from
which service provider. Then, SE creates a session id and then
communicates with SP to establish what information about
USR’s identity needs to be established and provides a list
{IV1, . . . , IVm} of identity verfiers from which the service
provider accepts documents. Again over the TLS channel be-
tween USR and SE , USR communicates the txid, hUSR, and
7User data: pkUSR, skUSR, pkSE , txidIV , ιUSR, branch of
Merkle tree, X0, . . . Xn.
1: Request USR → SE : (Name of service, SP)
2: Determine what to prove: SE ↔ SP:
• SE → SP: (Name of service, Session id)
• SP → SE : (Info to prove, {IV1, . . . , IVm},
Session id)
3: Prove: USR ↔ SE :
• SE → USR: (Info to prove, {IV1, . . . , IVm},
Session id)
• USR → SE : (txidIVj , hUSR, branch of Merkle tree,
Session id)
• SE uses the provided branch and the publicly avail-
able, most recent version of rIV,t to check that hUSR
is present in the tree and up-to-date
• USR ↔ SE : (interactive proof pi, Session id)
• SE checks the proof
4: Confirm: SE → SP: (Session id)
5: Grant of service: SP → USR (if this service is digital, it
might pass through the established connections between
SP and SE en route to USR)
the necessary branch of the Merkle tree corresponding to her
relevant identity as established in Section VII. Using the txid,
SE can follow the chain of updates, as in Section VII-B, to
obtain the most up-to-date version of rIV,t. Then, SE can use
hUSR and the intermediate hashes on the branch to compute
a value that can be compared to rIV,t to confirm the presence
of hUSR in the most up-to-date version of the tree, see Figure
2. SE can also verify that this identity was issued by an IV
on the list provided by SP . SE makes interactive requests of
knowledge which USR establishes via the interactive proof pi.
Note that the ability of USR to provide these proofs depends
on her knowledge of X0, . . . Xn. Particularly, X0, which only
USR should know as she randomly generates the secret X00
component, acts as a sort of key to the use of this identity
record.
Once SE is satisfied with the proofs provided by USR,
SE sends a confirmation to SP , and SP grants the service to
USR.
Remark 10: While the Brands proofs protect the user from
having to reveal unnecessary identity information to SP ,
SE nevertheless observes details about USR’s transactions,
specifically with which service providers USR is interacting.
If SE notices suspicious behavior on the part of the user, SE
might refuse to process a transaction or contact IV with a
warning in a manner akin to how fraudulent credit card activity
is detected.
Remark 11: Note that, if SP is not willing to completely
trust any single service enabler, a user might be required
to perform this process with several different SE . A smart
phone app with which the user has already exchanged keys
to establish TLS connections with each SE could effectively
coordinate this process.
Computed ?= rIV,t
Provided
0
Computed
Computed
hUSR
0
Provided
1
0
Provided
1
1
Figure 2. The verifications performed by SE to prove that hUSR is a branch
in the tree using the intermediate hashes of the branch provided by USR.
Namely, at each step moving up from the bottom, SE computes the hash
of what has already been computed with the next provided intermediate hash
and compares the ultimate result with rIV,t. Note that ιUSR in this example,
which gives the position of hUSR in the tree, is 100.
IX. KEY LOSS
We have seen that users must store the following informa-
tion: pkUSR, skUSR, pkSE , txidIV , and X0, . . . Xn in order
to use to perform authentications (and she must also have the
intermediate hashes on the branch of the Merkle tree on which
their identity record is located, possibly re-downloading them
from a service enabler). We consider the contingencies if a
user loses access to some or all of this information due, for
example, to a lost phone.
Note that skUSR serves only to establish a secure commu-
nications with SE , allowing them to exchange (potentially)
sensitive information. Particularly, as this key corresponds
to an account that can be obtained anonymously, skUSR is
not the basis for proving user identity, and serves mainly to
protect against man-in-the-middle attacks, where the attacker
intercepts and replays messages from USR in order to be
granted access to SP . This has the consequence that if skUSR
is lost, USR’s identity is not compromised, nor is her ability
to perform Brands proofs. Hence, in this case, USR should
simply generate a new pair sk′USR, pk
′
USR, and communicate
pk′USR to SE .
On the other hand, if X0 is lost, and there is not a backup
available to the user, she should contact IV , again with her
physical identity documents to justify her identity. Then IV
can issue an update to an existing identity record to establish
a new X ′0 as in Section VII-B.
X. SECURITY MODEL
As we discussed in Section V, USR must trust both IV and
SE to handle her personal information appropriately; however,
the information that USR must convey to SE is generally
much more limited than that conveyed to IV . Technically,
USR and SE should have the capacity to perform interactive
Brands proofs. As we saw in Proposition 1, the exchange of
Brands proofs reveals nothing about an identity except what
statements are being proved. Nonetheless, these statements
may be themselves sensitive. By encrypting them, our system
8protects this information in the same matter as a tradition
online authentication system even as the information that the
user must provide to SE is minimized.
We assume that IV properly issues updates to an identity
hUSR by overwriting the previous version of that identity
at index ιUSR. If IV fails to do this USR may have the
opportunity to continue to authenticate herself against an
identity that is out-of-date but appears valid to SE . Note that
if IV realizes that this type of error has been made (either due
to coding error, infiltration by hackers, etc), then it can correct
these errors in the next update, revoking redundant entries.
Abstractly, we make use of the public ledger functionality
of Bitcoin, namely that it acts as a “bulletin board” on which
anyone can post messages and read the messages that have
previously been posted. Specifically, we require that Bitcoin
have the properties of liveness, i.e. every honest participant
will have its posted messages seen by every honest participant
after some delay, and persistence, namely that every posted
message will indefinitely be seen at the same position by all
participants, see [26] and [27]. We also depend on the integrity
of the Bitcoin transaction verification procedure to check the
validity of transactions which includes checking that each non-
generation transaction has inputs corresponding to previous
transaction outputs, etc. The Bitcoin core protocol has been
proven to have these properties when quantitative bounds are
assumed on the relative power of the adversary to the honest
players, in terms of computing power in [26], or in terms of
computing power and influence over the peer-to-peer network
in [27]. However, these results are theoretical; in addition
to the risk that a hostile adversary may become powerful
enough to invalidate the quantitative bounds, there is also the
possibility that coding bugs or other accidental situations may
cause problems such as small forks, peer-to-peer failures, etc
[28].
More concretely, the Bitcoin aspect of our protocol serves
to allow IV to update an identity in an unequivocable manner,
and provides neutral infrastructure that is computationally pro-
tected against unauthorized modifications. The consequence
for our system of a fork would be to allow a user to
continue to authenticate against a non-updated copy of an
identity that should have been updated. This can be particularly
consequential if IV attempts to revoke a user identity. As a
result, service providers and service enablers might consider
suspending particularly sensitive authentications if SE detects
indications of a fork.
Note that the service enabler is the only actor in our
schema that needs to be capable of verifying the status of
Bitcoin transactions. In order to obtain the most up-to-date
information on the network available, SE should operate a
full node. (However, a user who wants to emulate the checks
performed by SE to see whether her identity is still valid could
obtain information about the Bitcoin network from running
a Simplified Payment Verification client [19] or even one or
more block explorers, accepting the risk that attacks against
these methods might hide from her an update to her identity
that would be seen by a full node.)
It is common practice for merchants accepting bitcoin
to wait several confirmations (several mined blocks) before
accepting a transaction as valid. A common rule-of-thumb
is to wait six confirmations (approximately one hour) after
a transaction to be confident that this transaction cannot be
reversed [19, Chapter 2]. In our scheme, the only party who
can double spend is IV , who we do not generally expect
to issue malicious, contradictory updates. If IV issues an
update transaction that is included in an orphaned block, but
ultimately does not make it into the main chain, IV can merely
include those user updates in a reissued transaction later.
SE and SP may still want to wait for a transaction to be
included in a few blocks so as to avoid authenticating users
against ephemeral records for auditing reasons. However, since
only IV can perform double spending in our scheme, our
system does not require the same level of caution against dou-
ble spending attacks that is employed for substantial financial
transactions in Bitcoin.
Finally, as Bitcoin is integrated into our structure, a net-
work attack that makes it impossible for IV to issue new
transactions or for SE to obtain information on the latest
transactions would function as a denial of service attack on our
system. This reflects the importance of using a well-established
blockchain such as Bitcoin with a large network rather than a
smaller, newer blockchain to be as robust as possible against
such attacks.
XI. BITCOIN TRANSACTIONS COSTS
We estimate the cost in Bitcoin transaction fees for an
IV to use this system. As the TXENROLL transaction has one
OP_RETURN output containing two SHA-256 hashes, P2PKH
output to aIV , —and one input (corresponding to a P2PKH
output of a previous transaction), the total size of its raw
transaction is approximately 265 bytes [19]. The amount of
bitcoin that must be paid in fees for a transaction of a given
sizes fluctuates based on market forces as miners must choose
which transactions to include in the block they are mining with
limited space; current (May 2017) estimates [29] suggest that
a fee of .0000036 bitcoin per byte is sufficient to have a high
likelihood that a transaction will be included in the next block.
This results in a fee for TXENROLL of approximately .000954
bitcoin or 2.17 USD (1 BTC=2280 USD, May 2017). If IV
has enough clients to justify emitting a TXENROLL every 10
minutes, this would require transaction fees of approximately
312 USD per day.
XII. STORAGE AND BANDWIDTH REQUIREMENTS
Consider that IV manages N = 226 ≈ 67 million users, the
size of a large bank. The dynamics of updates are low since
user identity is rather static, so for example, we consider that a
fraction fdaily = 1% of users have their identity fields changing
daily. This means a fraction f = fdaily/(6 · 24) updates every
Bitcoin block.
IV will issue updates which will be reflected in the root
hash of the Merkle tree created in the enrollment phase.
However, as discussed in Section VII-D, during the interaction
between SE and USR during the proof of identity phase, these
parties need to have access to the intermediate hashes of this
Merkle tree so that they can verify that hUSR is present in the
most recent version of the tree.
9A. SE stores information on behalf of IV
In order to be able to calculate the appropriate intermediate
hashes for any potential user of IV’s system, SE needs to store
all of the (occupied) leaves of the tree. This means storing, for
each leaf, a Brand commitment and the index of this leaf in
the tree (hUSR, ιUSR), which consists of a total of 64 bytes
per leaf. Hence, SE must store N · 64 bytes, or under our
assumptions 226 · 64 = 4.3 gigabytes for each IV for which
this service is provided. In an average block then SE will need
to update f ·N · 64 bytes, approximately 298 kilobytes each
10 minutes for each IV .
Additionally, in order to maintain a full node, SE must
download all new blocks, namely approximately 1 MB every
10 minutes, independent of the number of identity verifiers.
B. USR stores information necessary for her own authenti-
cations
For USR to store the intermediate hashes with which she
can verify her own identity against the root hash of the tree, she
does not need to store the entire tree. Instead, she can merely
store the single path down the tree against which her identity
will be hashed, to be presented to SE during the proof of
identity phase. A priori, this would require storing 256 hashes
each of 32 bytes, each of which will have to be regularly
updated as the other users update their information. However,
as most of the leaves of the tree are empty, in fact, USR will
on have average lower storage and bandwidth requirements.
Based on the same argument as in [22, Section 5.3], an aver-
age user will only have log2(N) many non-empty intermediate
hashes on her authentication path. If for each intermediate
hash, USR also stores its location in the tree, this corresponds
to 64 log2(N) bytes, or under our assumptions to storage of
1664 bytes. Similarly, as there are f ·N modification made to
the tree per block, on average only log2(f · N) elements of
USR’s authentication path in the tree will change. For each
change, USR requires the new value of this intermediate hash
and its position in the tree. Namely, USR must download
64 log2(f ·N) bytes of information for a total of approximately
780 bytes each block under our assumptions.
Thus, when a user wants to use her identity, she can
download the required information from one of these SE
whether that is the service enabler that she will correspond
with in the proof of identity phase or not. Depending on how
much time has passed since the user was last online, she may
need to download between 780 and 1664 bytes as discussed
in Section XII-A.
XIII. COMPARISON OF REVOCATION MECHANISM TO
REVOCATION IN PKIS
We briefly consider the advantages and disadvantages of
the update and revocation mechanism presented in Section
VII to the standard revocation systems that are used in public
key infrastructures: certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and the
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP).
Even though use of CRLs is limited to revoking certificates,
rather than allowing for more complex updates, their size,
which is linear in the number of revocations, can become quite
large. The median certificate has a revocation list on the order
of 50 KB, and CRLs of several megabytes are not uncommon
[1]. We saw in Section XII that the amount of information
required to verify the status of a user’s identity against an
up-to-date rIV,t is logarithmic in the number of IV ′s users,
on the order of 1 KB. On the other hand, as also discussed
in Section XII, the bandwidth required to run a Bitcoin full
node to be able to confirm that rIV,t is, in fact, up-to-date is
roughly 1MB every ten minutes, independent of the number of
identity verifiers. There are nonetheless situations where SE
is interacting with many identity verifiers, particularly when
SE is performing the role of a single sign on service, where
our update model would be advantageous from a bandwidth
perspective. Moreover, a user that runs a Simplified Payment
Verification client to validate that her identity is up-to-date,
need only download 80 byte block headers every ten minutes
and approximately 1 KB of information for each verification
of rIV,t [19].
OCSP was developed to alleviate the bandwidth concerns of
CRLs at the expense of requiring Certificate Authorities to be
“lively” in responding to requests on revocation status in real
time. As discussed in Section V, we seek to avoid requiring
such liveliness from identity verifiers.
Moreover, as shown in [1], a number of widely used,
modern browsers accept revoked certificates in certain cir-
cumstances. In contrast, note that our update mechanism is
integrated into the issuing system so that checking that a record
is up-to-date is done in the same process as checking that that
record exists at all. Hence, we minimize the possibility for
authentication to be separated from appropriate revocation.
Finally, denial of service attacks can be performed on public
key infrastructures by preventing verifiers from downloading
CRLs or communicating with a OCSP server. In our system,
as we saw in Section X, such attacks are defended by the
infrastructure of the Bitcoin network. In exchange for the
protections of this network, potentially non-negligible Bitcoin
fees must be paid, as seen in Section XI.
As such, while we are not proposing to completely replace
PKI models of revocation with blockchain based models
(indeed, the TLS connections we propose using during the
proof of identity phase make use of traditional public key
infrastructures), we argue that the revocation and update
mechanisms we have presented are a useful tool that will be
beneficial in certain use cases.
XIV. CONCLUSION
We have presented an architecture in which users can au-
thenticate themselves against records established by “identity
verifiers,” such as a bank or a utility company, even as these
verifiers do not need to store the personal data of the user
directly, following the spirit of [21]. As the business model
of the verifers does not necessarily focus on identification, we
outsource much of the operation of this system to a third party
“service enabler” who nonetheless learns no more than what
is necessary about the identity of the user. By making use of
the Bitcoin blockchain, we allow for a verifier to update or
revoke a user’s identity in a streamlined fashion.
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APPENDIX
We use the framework of Brands’ thesis [16] to discuss and
analyze the security of our update method in VII-B. In partic-
ular, [16, Definition 2.3.1] introduces the notion of instance
generators for one-way and collision intractable functions. In
the DLREP case, an instance generator is a way to generate
the group and the gi’s, and also to generate X0, . . . , Xn. In
Section IV-A, we have essentially recalled Brands standard
DLREP instance generator, and as soon as X0 is random,
the DLREP function is one-way and collision intractable [16,
Proposition 2.3.3]. As noted by Brands [16, page 61], if an
instance generator is indistinguishable from the basic DLREP
instance generator, the security theorems of his thesis still hold.
We prove here that, under the random oracle model (i.e. the
hash function H is a random function), the instance generator
provided by the method in VII-B is indistinguishable from
the basic method in IV-A. In IV-A, X0 is generated at random,
while in VII-B, X(k)0 = X00+H
k(X01), where X00 and X01
are random. Since H is modeled as a random function, and
since the addition is done in a cyclic group, X(k)0 is as random
as X0 in the basic method, thus, the instance generators are
statistically indistinguishable. This proves that each updated
h
(k)
USRi is a one-way and collision intractable function of X00,
X01, and X
(k)
1 , . . . , X
(k)
n .
Now we discuss the security with respect to a malicious IV .
[16, Proposition 2.4.8] and the following discussion also shows
that the basic protocol for proving knowledge of a DLREP
in IV-A is complete and sound for the basic instance generator.
Being indistinguishable, the same holds true for our instance
generator in VII-B. Thus, if a dishonest IV , knowing X01,
wants to use h(k)USRi to authenticate as the user, it has to know
X
(k)
0 = X00 +H
k(X01) (completeness), which is equivalent
to IV knowing X00 (subtraction). Thus, it is not feasible for
IV to authenticate without knowing the secret X00, which is
protected by the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem.
This continues to hold for each successive updated h(k)USRi .
